Macroeconomic research: Can the resilience of China’s export share continue in 2023 after the EU accepts orders from the United States?


Analysis conclusion According to US customs data in November 2022, the cumulative proportion of US imports from the EU surpassed that of China. Since China surpassed the EU for the first time in 2009, this situation has only occurred once in 2019, when the Sino-US trade friction was the most intense. Against this background, looking forward to 2023, how will the share of external demand and China’s exports evolve? How do you view the marginal changes in current trade frictions?

This article will discuss these contents. The transfer of trade orders from China by the United States is the result of long-term friction and the narrowing of short-term efficiency advantages. Since Q4 of 2022, the proportion of U.S. imports of manufactured goods from China has accelerated, while the proportion of U.S. imports from the European Union has risen rapidly.

In terms of commodities, the products that China’s exports to the United States have decreased correspond to the main export products of the European Union, and the import structure of the United States has changed little. After Q4, there is limited necessity to import from the European Union. Nor does the EU have an advantage. The reason, we believe, is that, on the one hand, Sino-US trade frictions have intensified since 2019, and the proportion of US imports from China is on the decline as a whole, breaking through this threshold in 2022; on the other hand, the efficiency of domestic and foreign supply chains in 2022 The narrowing of the gap has accelerated this process. Taking the port punctuality rate as an example, the gap between domestic and foreign countries in Q4 of 2022 will be far smaller than that at the end of 2021.

Globally, the resilience of China’s exports is not consistent with the story of the “de-Sinicization” of the United States. China’s export share in 2023 is still worth looking forward to. In addition to the rapid decline in the proportion of U.S. imports from China, there are several details in the international trade data in 2022 that deserve attention: (1) Similar to the United States, we can also see that the proportion of EU imports from China is decreasing, but behind the scenes The key is the large exogenous impact, rather than the EU’s promotion of “de-sinicization”, and thanks to China’s acceptance of part of the EU’s order demand, the proportion of EU imports from China is still higher than the average in the same period from 2015 to 2019; (2 ) In the context of the general upsurge of bulk commodities in 2022, the situation of China, Japan, South Korea, the European Union and other industrial product exporters is similar, and China’s export share is not bad in comparison; (3) China’s export share in 2023 The advantages of the industrial chain are expected to continue. On the one hand, China has the advantages of the entire industrial chain, and the fluctuation of exports will be smaller.

The ability to undertake order transfers based on global trade demand hotspots is also stronger. For example, in 2022, China has successfully undertaken the export share of some German cars. , and China’s ship orders are far ahead by the end of 2022 (China’s share of the global new ship market share is about 75.2% in December 2022), which shows that even though the domestic supply chain is under greater pressure in 2022, overseas still maintains confidence in China’s manufacturing industry; On the other hand, there are still congestion points in the global supply chain, and with the further recovery of China’s production momentum, the advantages of China’s supply chain efficiency are expected to be reflected again in 2023.

Taking China and South Korea as an example, in 2022, South Korea’s deficit with China for many consecutive months , The last time this phenomenon occurred was back in 1994, and some of the products were directly related to South Korea’s advantageous industries, which is enough to illustrate the advantages of Chinese manufacturing. It should be noted that ASEAN plays an important role in the resilience of China’s export share. In 2022, China’s exports to ASEAN will account for 15.8% of total exports, surpassing the EU for the first time and becoming China’s second largest export destination.

There are certain short-term factors (such as the energy crisis in the European Union), but it is undeniable that the industrial chains of ASEAN and China are getting closer. Looking forward to the follow-up, we believe that the proportion of European and American markets in China’s exports will further decline. Instead, under the promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative, the formation of large regional markets in Asia will be accelerated, and the industrial chain will be more closely linked. In 2023, external demand is likely to be weak, partly due to short-term factors, such as weakening overseas consumer demand after the policy stimulus effect fades, energy spending crowding out European consumption capacity, high inventory levels in the United States, and some long-term factors, such as post-epidemic The efficiency of global supply chains has decreased, regional uneven development has increased, and so on. In addition, normalized trade frictions are not conducive to the transformation of aggregate demand into trade volume.

On the one hand, the game between China and the United States is escalating. On the other hand, whether there will be trade friction between China and Europe, which is more similar to the “grey rhinoceros” incident, the key lies in the future How climate politics will further spill over into the economic field, with specific tools such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM, carbon tariff) that will be officially launched in October this year, or the “loss and damage” fund that may be unveiled at the UN climate summit next year, and so on. risk warning There are still uncertainties in the final direction of the epidemic, which poses a severe challenge to my country’s overall planning of epidemic prevention and control and economic and social development; the calculation of global trade data and the impact of carbon tariffs are based on certain assumptions, and may not be able to reflect the actual situation in a timely and accurate manner; , Changes in the political environment exceeded expectations, leading to a decline in global trade demand.

Source: sina